Putting regulation before responsibility:
Towards Binding Norms of Corporate Social Responsibility

ABSTRACT
Globalization of business has heightened concerns regarding corporate conduct
in developing countries. Critics have charged that multinational firms in particular have
exported social harms involving labor, the environment, bribery, and human rights to
jurisdictions outside of their home countries. Opportunities for regulatory arbitrage and
the associated collective action problem such opportunities suggest, highlight the need
for strong regulatory responses to these issues. Rather than prioritize the strengthening
of national or international regulatory actors to address these social harms, voluntary
corporate social responsibility initiatives have emerged as a favored response within the
international community. This article undertakes a critical examination of the rationale
for these initiatives. It argues that the premises on which they are grounded are flawed
insofar as they ignore basic research concerning the drivers of regulatory compliance,
fail to remedy underlying social harms, contravene broader goals of fostering strong
regulatory institutions in developing countries, and undermine economic development to
the extent that they erode state capacity in setting economic and regulatory policies. As
an alternative to purely voluntaristic measures, this article emphasizes the need to build
the capacity of local regulatory authorities. It cites two cases involving the use of
domestic regulatory and enforcement power in African states as examples of how the
empowerment of state institutions can constitute more effective responses to significant
social harms.

I.

Introduction
Corporate activities that harm the environment, violate labor and human rights,

and corrupt state actors and institutions remain problems in all market economies.
Nowhere are these problems more acute than in developing countries. On the other hand,
in developed countries, it is generally thought that state action constitutes a principle
remedy to market failure. On this view, domestic regulatory systems can do the work of
protecting the environment and worker rights, while the judiciary can ensure that human
rights are upheld and corruption prosecuted. Yet the general view is that, whether due to
inadequate resources, ineptitude, or perfidy, the same expectations do not hold for
developing countries.1 As evidence of corporate transgressions has mounted, it is
noteworthy that there have been few calls for international super-regulators to oversee
these matters. Nor has much attention been devoted to remedying the presumed
shortcomings in developing country regulatory systems that inhibit effective reductions in
these social harms. Instead, the solution among policy makers and many activists has
centered around voluntary corporate social responsibility (CSR) measures.2
CSR is an umbrella term that refers to a variety of initiatives ranging from
voluntary codes of conduct to programs whereby companies can undergo external audits
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to verify the adequacy of their practices in a variety of areas of social concern. 3
Although generally lacking formal state power of sanction, these efforts look to
international law for their normative authority. As such, they intend to apply sometimeslatent international legal prescriptions directly to corporations. Following the practices of
many state-level regulatory programs in recent years, these initiatives are consistent with
the broader trend in regulatory policy away from so-called “command and control”
regulatory techniques and towards voluntary firm-level self-regulation and self-policing.4
While important in helping to galvanize public opinion around the issues, this
article contends that, as currently constituted, voluntary CSR initiatives remain
problematic. Properly understood, voluntary CSR measures should supplement not
supplant state regulation.5 Yet supporters of voluntary CSR initiatives fail to recognize
this fact. They equivocate on the role of government regulation and thus create a
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confused picture as to the proper role of CSR.6 The reasons for this equivocation are not
incidental but rather central to the CSR movement.7
There are two reasons for this phenomenon. The first issue relates to the
competing discourses involved in addressing CSR questions. Roughly stated, these
discourses can be defined as globalist or developmentalist. The globalists include those
whose inspiration for addressing CSR matters stems from globalization, which they
reduce to questions of foreign direct investment (FDI) and outsourcing by multinational
corporations in developing countries.8 Among the globalists are those who posit a
declining—even shrinking role—for the state.9 Globalists contend that multinational
corporations (MNCs) elude national regulation because they operate in multiple
6
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jurisdictions.10 On the other hand, as the name suggests, developmentalists view matters
from a developmental perspective. On this view, the challenge of private sector
activities in developing countries is not limited to issues of FDI and outsourcing but
rather involves broader issues of institutional and market strengthening and coordination
with other development priorities.
In this paper, I contend that the globalists have framed the debate incorrectly. A
key reason for this conceptual mistake is that the globalists have wrongly assumed that
the state is in decline. This view is a broad-brush swipe rather than the product of
detailed analysis. Indeed, developments in the field of comparative and international
political economy show that the story is much more complicated.11 On this view, rather
than international convergence towards one model of capitalism, states maintain
distinctive types of market economies and respond to the pressures of globalization in
distinct ways.12 Moreover, state level regulatory systems remain central to defining the
trajectories of different systems.13 Other studies speak more of a changing role of the
state or of the state being constrained in certain respects, but belie the hyperbolic claim
that the state is declining in importance, is less relevant, or is unable to do its job.14
Rather than true across the board, the constraints hypothesis may be true in some respects
but less in others. In particular, while states may be constrained in areas of monetary
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policy and financial markets, there appears to be much less support for the view that the
state is constrained in matters of social, trade, industry, and innovation policies.15 Even
the sly multinational enterprises (MNEs) credited for supposedly eluding law and
regulation of states, are subject to the laws of every jurisdiction in which they do
business.16 Indeed, the race to the bottom argument often made in reference to MNEs’
supposed attempts to seek out unregulated markets also does not stand up to scrutiny.17 If
states cannot be shown to be subject to substantial constraints in the exercise of power to
control social harms by firms, then a key argument for international rather than state
based corporate social responsibility measures would seem to be lost. Moreover, even if
states can be shown to be too weak to deal with implacable MNCs, then what grounds
exist for believing that mere voluntary measures will prove sufficiently potent
instruments of control?
Second, the globalists have reduced most of the problems involving economic
activity in developing countries to exogenous factors attributable to linkages with
advanced industrial economies. Economic globalization thus emerges as the culprit,
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while endogenous sources of social harm are ignored.18 While recognizing that the
problems associated with economic globalization are real, the problems affecting
capitalist development in developing countries are not reducible to problems of economic
globalization. Were we to magically ensure that all outsourcing and FDI were done in
accordance with the highest international standards, many developing countries would
still face massive problems of regulation and governance directly related to the types of
social harms that CSR attempts to address. Only the developmentalist perspective speaks
to those needs.
The globalists’ third misconception relates to the reasons behind this set of
assumptions. To uncover these reasons, one must examine recent economic and political
history. As this paper will argue, that history exposes the intellectual roots of voluntary
CSR programs in neoliberal economics. It calls into question a shared assumption among
CSR advocates that market failure can be remedied by market mechanisms.
This paper is divided into five parts. Part II consists of an overview of some of
the intellectual, policy, and business trends that have fed support for CSR programs.
This paper contends that a proper understanding of CSR initiatives involves recognition
of its origins in the post Reagan-Thatcher regulatory agenda, which has changed
fundamental expectations about business regulation and economic development. Part III
critiques some of the key assumptions concerning voluntary CSR programs with
particular attention to concerns in developing countries. It highlights two significant
problems, first, the lack of rigorous enforcement of such initiatives, and, second, the lack
of state involvement in their enforcement and definition, which undermines broader
development goals of democratic governance and the creation of well-regulated market
18
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economies. In light of these problems, this paper argues for using capacity building of
legal and regulatory authorities as a way to address these issues. Part IV describes and
analyzes two examples of how domestic legal and regulatory actors can be empowered to
further the public interest in their societies. A conclusion follows in part V.
II.

Intellectual history
To understand where the voluntary CSR movement draws its raison d’être, one

must consider recent intellectual history. Three general trends are worth noting: first, the
demise of the post-WWII regulatory and developmental state, as exemplified by the New
Deal institutions in the United States and social democracy in Europe; second, marketoriented radical transformations affecting business organizations; and, third, the
emergence, as a result of these trends, of new programs of self-regulation throughout the
developed world. What follows is a simplification of these complex trends, however, it
should nevertheless help contextualize the environment in which voluntary CSR
programs have emerged.
A.

Changing Nature of the State

The modern regulatory state emerged alongside the growth of industrial
economies.19 The conditions necessitating greater governmental control over economic
activities include increases in harmful externalities, such as pollution, injuries to workers,
monopolistic tendencies within industry, a multiplication of the number of economic
actors, and an increase in technological complexity requiring greater coordination
between firms. Government’s ability to address these new concerns depended upon the
creation of large administrative units or bureaucracies to support its efforts. The
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multiplicity of actors and situations required a vast regulatory apparatus supported by
large resource allocations.
For the sake of illustration and because of its influential role in affecting
regulatory practices internationally, I will relate the United States experience. In the
United States, the modern regulatory state was, in large part, an outgrowth of the New
Deal. Prior to that time, the federal government played a relatively small economic and
social role.20 What regulation existed was accomplished primarily through common law
courts.21 Judges, not bureaucrats, were the arbiters of regulation. As the guardians of the
common law, judges resisted attempts by legislatures to enact laws protecting health,
safety, and the environment as unwarranted infringements on the judiciary’s power to
determine proper regulatory objectives. The Lochner decision22, in which the Supreme
Court struck down a New York statute limiting the hours bakers could work on the
grounds that it unconstitutionally infringed the freedom to contract, was one of the more
notable examples of this type of thinking. Legislative efforts to regulate the market grew
significantly with the New Deal. After initially suffering losses when the Supreme Court
cast aside a number of early New Deal enactments, the Roosevelt administration
succeeded in enacting numerous laws to minimize social harms of the market.23 This
marked the beginning of a larger trend. Between the New Deal and the 1970s, the federal
government was to create dozens of new agencies designed to regulate a whole range of
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industries and remedy a variety of social ills.24 The scope of the changes that occurred
has led some constitutional scholars to consider the period a second American “rights
revolution” or an effective amendment to the federal constitution.25 Similar trends
occurred in Western European and developing countries. The growth of capitalism
everywhere spurred efforts to restrain its negative effects.
Noteworthy among these developments is the fact that regulation underwent a
qualitative change from the New Deal to the 1960s and 1970s. In the New Deal period,
the primacy of Keynesian economics led to a regulatory agenda designed to better
manage the economy.26 By the 1960s and 1970s, government regulation became more
concerned with promoting individual rights than with promoting collective goods.27
Across OECD countries, as regulation became less about demand management through
such institutions as centralized wage bargaining and more about individual rights (e.g.
laws against discrimination in employment), broader support for a dominant state
presence in the economy eroded.
The emergence of economic stagnation and growing business unrest over
bureaucratic “red tape”, fed arguments for curtailing the growth of the federal
bureaucracy in the U.S.28 The economic crises of the late 1970s and early 1980s-stagflation, energy shortages, and a decline in international competitiveness--led to
complaints over regulatory controls.29 Congress also began asserting its power, seeking
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to reign in administrative action.30 Likewise, courts started scrutinizing agency actions
with greater frequency.31 Immediately after his election, President Reagan began a
program of comprehensive regulatory reform. The reforms instituted by Reagan at that
time have since been transmitted throughout the advanced industrialized economies and
developing countries.32 It is important to review their main elements.
The signing of Executive Order 12291 by President Reagan ushered in a
comprehensive program of ex ante procedures and criteria applied to any new
regulation.33 This change involved the empowerment of the U.S. Office of Management
and Budget to act as a central authority for scrutinizing new regulatory initiatives. Two
moves proved particularly instrumental in setting the climate in which emphasis on
voluntary CSR grew. First, the order mandated the use of cost benefit analysis and the
choice of the least burdensome alternative in connection with any proposed regulation.34
Second, it mandated that regulators consider alternatives before advancing new
regulations.35 With this subtle shift, the view of the state as a taking on a strong role in
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controlling capitalism was replaced by a general presumption against regulation unless it
could be otherwise justified.36
The OECD regulatory reform program illustrates how diffuse these practices have
become. According to the OECD, states have adopted regulatory management systems
involving explicit standards for regulatory quality, the use of regulatory impact analysis,
systematic public consultation on regulation, use of alternatives to regulation, review and
updating of regulation, and reduction in administrative red tape.37 It is safe to say that
these principles represent mainstream thinking on regulation today.
Aside from the question of defining proper regulatory ends was the question of
means. Critics complained that “command and control” regulatory regimes were costly
and unnecessarily punitive.38 This attack sought to eliminate rigid governmental
prescriptions and instead allow for greater flexibility in achieving traditional regulatory
aims.39 The result has been, among other things, a growing shift to self-regulatory or
management-based regulatory strategies, described more fully in Part II.C below.
The second prong of the regulatory reform agenda has been a program of
deregulation in areas including communications and broadcasting, discrimination,
endangered species, occupational health and safety, public utilities, and the
environment.40 Deregulatory programs were followed by successive waves of reregulation. In the area of economic regulation, states created new frameworks for
introducing competition into previously uncompetitive industries through unbundling,
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withdrawal of subsidies, and use of competition law. In the area of social regulation,
enforcement was frequently weakened and in some areas regulatory burdens lightened.
The push for deregulation and regulatory reform originating in OECD countries
has since been exported globally through the intervention of international financial
institutions. Drawing from the widely shared belief that excessive regulation hampered
economic growth, development agencies promote the reduction of unnecessary regulatory
barriers such as excessive red tape.41 Likewise, structural adjustment programs have
forced reductions in state spending that have compromised state regulatory capacity in
some instances.42 International trade agreements have also driven states to remove rules
that discriminate against foreign firms, thus reducing regulatory burdens in certain areas.
The third change in the nature of regulation was the demise of the developmental
state in both OECD and developing countries. Slowing growth in OECD countries
helped bring about the decline of the Keynesian developmental state. Driven by
declining growth rates, tax revolt, and the need for fiscal restraint to avoid currency
devaluation in a post-Bretton Woods environment, state dirigiste policies fell into
disrepute. Restraints on state subsidies for national champions and caps on budget
deficits as a result of economic integration further tied the state’s hands. In combination
with many of these forces, developing countries faced added pressure for fiscal prudence
from international financial institutions. In light of the manifest shortcomings of import
substitution policies and the subsequent debt crisis, structural adjustment programs and
conditionality were imposed on states as a way of reducing wasteful support for state
owned enterprises and profligate expenditures on state owned industry and infrastructure.
41
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The rise of the good governance agenda and its application to states in the South further
pressured them to avoid the risk of corruption through wholesale reductions in statesponsored investment.43 Privatization, competition, and a reduction of state involvement
in the economy have become central components of economic policy more generally and
development policy more specifically.44 The simultaneous reduction in domestic demand
management and downward pricing pressures on products due to international
competition and technological change, brought about a decline in aggregate demand in
many countries.45 Consequences notwithstanding, private sector development is now the
dominant, if not sole, economic policy paradigm.46 Osborne and Gaebler’s now famous
metaphor about the state steering and not rowing has diffused internationally.47 A
dramatically different model of the state has become dominant in OECD countries,
developing countries generally, and sub-Saharan Africa in particular.
B.

Increased Managerial Innovation and Flexibility

In the last thirty years, management and production have undergone tremendous
change. It is not, as the most exuberant proponents of the “new economy” suggest, one
that renders traditional criteria for valuing companies wholly irrelevant. Instead, it
constitutes a change in the fundamental approaches to private enterprise. According to
the new approach to management, the ability to change, constantly improve processes,
and reduce costs is a hallmark of success.48
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Throughout much of the Twentieth Century, business organizations, particularly
larger firms, tended to be bureaucratic, centrally organized,49 and, as a result, slow and
frequently inefficient. This corporate model, typified by the system of Fordist mass
production, established set manufacturing processes and rigid management techniques,
thereby limiting opportunities for change.50 Gradually throughout developed economies,
reductions in aggregate demand, increased international competition that limited pricing
power, shortened product cycles that rendered inventories obsolete more quickly, and
growing knowledge intensity of work, strained more bureaucratic business models.51 In
addition, the emergence and success of many high technology companies, with few fixed
assets, led many to see flexibility and intellectual capital as the hallmarks of success.52
Three interrelated changes are particularly noteworthy. First, firms began
incorporating team production methods on an increasing basis. In contrast to the large
centrally directed firm described in the work of Alfred Chandler, decentralized structures,
oriented to team or group decision making, became diffuse.53 Under the influence of
Japanese production techniques, firms began incorporating production practices that put
increasing control in the hands of employee directed teams.54 Decentralized groups were
given the opportunity to use their judgment to set priorities and improve processes.55
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Second, many firms began to incorporate flexible production techniques. The
move to flexible production, shortened production times and made product offerings
more responsive to changes in demand.56 Whereas a high degree of responsiveness to
demand used to be confined to small, craft producers, the latter part of the Twentieth
Century saw the profusion of these techniques in larger firms.57 The development of just
in time inventory practices, for instance, has allowed businesses to anticipate and respond
to demands of the market while eliminating sunken inventory costs in outmoded and
uncompetitive products.58 Today’s firms can combine a high degree of flexibility in
product offerings with high throughput.
Third, firms instituted new approaches to quality control. Techniques such as
benchmarking, or “iterated goal setting”, in which the development of a new product is
based on comparisons of best practices in an industry and consideration of competing
alternative products,59 have become recognized as leading management techniques. The
central feature of this type of process is the review and modification of these goals in
light of experience.60 Error detection and correction in many firms now occur in real
time.61 Moreover, through the process of standardization, such thinking has even
become institutionalized. ISO 9000, a widely-used management system standard, has
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effectively codified the practice of constant monitoring and continuous improvement with
respect to quality assurance.62
These changes in business organization have allowed firms to adapt to uncertainty
caused by rapid changes in economic institutional and technological environments.63 In
contrast to more rigid manufacturing processes, in which manufacturing decisions are
seen as fixed, the new system treats every arrangement as provisional.64
As a result of these changes in business practices, the task of the regulator has
become more challenging. No longer can governments bank on consistent business
practices in setting regulatory requirements. The very malleability of management
practices makes it difficult to simply pinpoint the business practices for which regulation
is needed. Before agencies can promulgate regulations controlling a certain type of
conduct, a given practice may become outmoded. The relative decline in vertical
integration strategies brought about through contracting, has given rise to more network
forms of organization. As consequence of this increased flexibility in business,
governments are always playing catch-up to the economy. It is not that firms necessarily
evade regulatory initiatives but instead they may change their practices so frequently that
regulators are often slow to catch up.65 Within this framework, traditional command and
control regulatory systems have had to change.
C.
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While self-regulation has existed in a variety of forms for years (e.g. stock
exchanges and the legal profession in the United States), a growing sense of the
inadequacy of command and control regulation in the 1980s and 1990s led to increased
attention to alternative regulatory programs. The idea was a pragmatic response to
diminished resources and a realization that traditional regulation had generated
unintended consequences and frequently been ineffective.66 In the United States, the
advent of the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines in 1991 set the stage for greater
reliance on firm-level compliance as a way to leverage dwindling state resources and
ensure that regulatory objectives were achieved.67 Throughout the OECD, regulators no
longer see companies purely in adversarial terms but also frequently recognize them as
important partners in achieving regulatory objectives.68
As a result, firm-level self-regulatory measures have grown in importance.
Typically compliance or management-based regulatory strategies provide incentives for
firms to voluntarily implement compliance systems and sanction firms that lack such
systems.69 While the approaches taken differ between jurisdictions, there is widespread
agreement that declining state resources, growth in the number of regulated entities,
complexity of business, and the inefficacy of traditional command and control regulation,
require regulators to leverage the resources of private entities in pursuing regulatory
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objectives.70 Similar considerations would seem to hold in developing countries, albeit to
different extents and degrees.
In some cases, rather than focus exclusively on adherence to clear cut rules
process-oriented solutions have been advocated. ISO 9000, the quality assurance
standard, and ISO 14000, the environmental standard developed under the auspices of the
International Organization for Standardization have proved influential in putting the
management systems approach at the center of debates on regulation. These approaches
afford companies greater latitude in achieving compliance: so long as they adopt the
proper processes for addressing a particular regulatory issue, companies can satisfy
regulatory requirements. Of course, this approach has its shortcomings as many
observers have noted that companies can have the correct process in place while failing to
achieve substantive performance criteria.
III.

Critique of Voluntary CSR from a Developmental Perspective
In light of the historical context provided above, this section undertakes a critical

examination of voluntary corporate social responsibility. First, I argue that if norms such
as protecting the environment or human rights are generally valued, taking a purely
voluntary approach to promoting compliance with such norms will produce few results.
Second, I argue that notwithstanding the presumed international dimension of CSR,
control of individual business firms is generally the province of states. Third, I argue that
voluntary, international CSR programs undermine development priorities of
strengthening domestic governance insofar as domestic regulatory institutions fail to
develop their capacities to protect their citizens. Finally, I contend that a more robust
70
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model of regulation complements efforts to transcend the neoliberal model of the state by
positing a positive role for the state in driving economic development.
A.

Generating Compliance: The Limitations of CSR

The best argument that voluntary CSR proponents advance as the means of
generating compliance with CSR norms is based on economic incentives. For the most
part, these economic incentives and disincentives are linked to corporate reputation.
Thus, the theory CSR proponents advance maintains that firms respond to CSR related
concerns as a result of the self-interested goal of boosting their reputations with
consumers, trading partners and investors. A good reputation is thought to translate into
improved sales and profitability or higher stock price and a bad reputation into their
opposite. With respect to the influence on sales, reputational effects would be most
evident for companies having strong consumer brands. Examples include the consumer
pressure brought to bear on companies such as Nike for its reportedly abusive labor
practices or Shell for its failure to intercede on behalf of Ken Saro Wiwa. In the jargon
of CSR, a key challenge of the movement is to exploit these “reputational drivers”
effectively. Firms will act in a socially responsible manner in order to maintain positive
reputations among the public, proponents argue. It is worth noting that this argument is
neoclassical in substance. Unpacking the argument exposes the following logic:
(1) Firms will choose to do what is economically in their best interests.
(2) Acting in a socially responsible manner clearly inures to their economic
benefit.
(3) Therefore, firms will follow social responsibility norms.

As the following analysis of regulation and compliance shows, this logic is
fundamentally mistaken. If CSR was intended to correct market failure, does it make
sense to rely exclusively on market forces as the solution?71
Even conceding that certain firms might be responsive to incentives for improved
stock price or customer pressures, these factors are unlikely to generate a high level of
compliance. Consumers, trading partners and shareholders may not countenance slave
labor practices by firms or massive disregard for the environment such as occurred at
Bhopal. Yet given the large number of companies operating in the world, the limited
attention of the actors involved, and the voluntary nature of the whole arrangement, it is
unlikely that companies will be driven to achieve more than a minimum of social
responsibility. Most companies are simply unknown to most consumers and, as
experience has shown, to the extent consumers seem to respond to these issues, they have
focused on a handful of companies. Likewise, pressures of investors to promote CSR
among companies is essentially limited to listed firms and in any event generate
relatively low powered incentives to which companies respond by trying to avoid major
scandals.
Yet there is reason to question the strong rationality assumptions that CSR
proponents attribute to firms. It is not self-evident that even if the posited incentives
exist, firms will necessarily choose to act upon them. Indeed, this assumption is itself
neoclassical in nature. The evolutionary tradition in economics and the related field of
71
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capabilities theory have supplemented the neoclassical view by exploring limitations on
profit maximizing behavior. Nelson and Winter have argued convincingly that rather
than maximize profits at every stage, firms are profit seeking.72 Existing paths and the
results of intrafirm “truces” may persuade many employees to leave well enough alone.73
In summary, there is reason to believe that serious flaws are involved with any
CSR initiative that relies almost exclusively on market forces to drive firm adoption.
Although discussions of CSR have tended to view them as without historical parallel, this
is certainly not the case. Studies of organizational compliance are well advanced and
bear intrinsically on the question of what public policy actors can do to induce firm
compliance with particular norms. Of particular relevance are socio-legal studies and
comparative analyses of organizational compliance in OECD countries.
As recognized by many regulatory scholars, there are four types of companies
with which regulators have to deal.74 Those who know the law and are willing to follow
it (Group A), those who don’t know the law but would like to be law abiding (Group B),
those who know the law and don’t want to follow it (Group C) and those who don’t know
the law and don’t wish to be law abiding (Group D). Most CSR literature does not even
reflect these basics. As this analysis suggests, Group A firms are willing to comply on
intrinsic grounds. Yet for CSR proponents, it seems that it is precisely Group A that
represents its greatest source of support. Surely CSR must be more ambitious than
seeking to ensure that the good continue to be good.
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The most convincing argument in favor of voluntary CSR strategies concerns
Group B firms. In this case, CSR can serve an educational purpose. The precise limits of
CSR are visible with respect to companies in Groups C and D. On this logic, CSR
proponents contend that Group C and D firms should follow CSR norms because it is
economically rational to do so. To these proponents, I ask: as rational economic actors,
why aren’t they already doing it? Bounded rationality can be the only answer. Indeed,
bounded rationality may explain the move towards CSR by Group B firms. Yet if Group
C and D firms, after having been shown the error of their ways by CSR campaigners,
have not acted, can one still rely on bounded rationality to explain their behavior? Could
it be that there are good, countervailing economic reasons to explain the socially
irresponsible behavior of these firms?
A wide range of compliance literature supports these arguments. Generally it
shows that voluntary standards are not self-enforcing. Firm compliance decisions are not
solely responsive to the threat of sanction, however, some form of sanction is an essential
element to firms’ willingness comply.75 In competitive markets without the risk of
sanction, the likelihood of opportunism by firms goes way up.76 One of the leading
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proposals for management-based regulation advanced by Ayers and Braithewaite
recognizes this fact explicitly. They call not for voluntary self-regulation as a stand-alone
solution, but instead as part of a system of governmentally-enforced self-regulation.77
They reason that firms must have discretion to determine appropriate means of achieving
regulatory goals but that government must oversee and enforce relevant standards,
particularly in dealing with less cooperative firms.
In contrast to CSR discussions in which reputational advantage is the dominant
driver, research has helped conceptualize compliance in terms of a dynamic process.
Bridget Hutter conceptualizes compliance as an outgrowth of a long standing relationship
and series of interactions between the regulated firm and regulators.78 From this
perspective, one can say that firms have an enforcement “career”, meaning, an ongoing
relationship between the firm and the regulator.79 “Enforcement officials interpret,
classify, and test the regulated and act accordingly,” she writes.80 Consistent with the
notion of graduated enforcement pyramids developed by Braithwaite and Ayers, as this
regulatory career unfolds, the regulator can gradually ratchet up coercion in the event that
seeking to recover $1.3 billion in state funds deposited in 23 UK banks by the Abacha regime. Susan
Hawley and Andrew Phillips, Bribery Begins at Home, THE GUARDIAN, 6 October 2004. The lack of
prosecutions perhaps explains the view of 60 percent of German firms surveyed that the risk of corruption
was “of no real significance” and therefore changing management practices were not necessary. Jimmy
Burns, Laws Fail to Halt international Business Bribery, FIN. TIMES, October 14, 2002. Similar views
were found in another survey by the investment firm Friends Ivory & Sime. According to their findings, “a
large proportion [of companies surveyed] appears to have inadequate policies and implementation
mechanisms.” The Economist, The Short Arm of the Law, 28 Feb. 2002. Moreover, the Economist
contends that while “a few” multinationals have taken steps to eliminate bribery, many more “have merely
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the regulated firm fails to comply.81 This view does not assume that coercion must be
used but rather it recognizes that achieving something more than compliance among the
willing requires an array of instruments and regulatory authorities with historical and ongoing knowledge of the entities they regulate.82 In other words, voluntary compliance
may occur spontaneously but any serious discussion of compliance with a given
regulatory regime requires some reference to enforcement tools as well.83 Indeed, the
very notion of voluntary compliance posited by Ayers and Braithwaite contends that the
coercive power of the regulator is essential to generating voluntary compliance.84
Sophisticated public policies reflect this realistic understanding of the place of
sanctions in any regulatory regime. One innovative approach to assessing the likelihood
that regulatory compliance will occur was developed by the Ministry of Justice and
Erasmus University in the Netherlands. They produced a Table of Eleven (T11) key
determinants of compliance that effectively synthesized much of the learning around the
topic.85 What this framework shows is that the factors driving compliance decisions are
multifaceted and complex. The T11 indicators break down the analysis into three
aspects: (1) spontaneous compliance dimensions (i.e. those that generate voluntary
compliance), (2) control dimensions (factors based on the likelihood of enforcement as
drivers of the compliance decision), and (3) sanctions dimensions.
Consistent with the earlier discussion of Group A and B firms, most CSR
compliance can be attributed to spontaneous factors. Following the T11 analysis,
81
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knowledge and general acceptance of particular CSR rules or standards by firms, their
normative commitment to such rules or standards, and the possibility of informal control,
account for most CSR compliance.86 Contrary to radical skeptics, the existence of these
influences show that firms are not wholly opportunistic.
Again, this is only the beginning of the analysis. Voluntary CSR initiatives—
unlike binding state-imposed regulations--can rely only on these spontaneous drivers of
compliance. Standing alone these considerations are insufficient. They ignore Group C
and D firms and fail to take into account the fact that the phenomenon of spontaneous
compliance occurs within a regulatory system that provides for sanctions for noncompliance. To deal with Group C and D firms (and to motivate A and B firms), the
control and sanctions dimensions of the T11 framework are of critical importance.87
Factors such as the control probability (T7) and detection probability (T8) reflect the fact
that scrutiny of firms by regulators contributes significantly to levels of compliance.
When dealing with uncooperative firms, the state’s ability to devote substantial resources
to such investigations is an important contributor to its success. Moreover, regulatory
and law enforcement bodies can enforce their audit powers through the courts. The state
can even employ the threat of enforcement as a bluffing strategy designed to push
recalcitrant firms into compliance.88 Such factors clearly influence the seriousness with
which the audit is perceived by the audited firm. It is only logical that it also positively
influences compliance. In contrast, private verification schemes, although more thorough
86
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than self-reporting systems, do not permit auditors an unlimited amount of time. Without
anyone mandating the audit, the incentives of the firms undergoing audit to limit the costs
of the endeavor by reducing its duration are great.
Finally, sanctions regulators possess extend beyond direct economic penalties.
They can issue warnings, suspend licenses of firms or their agents, deny permits, issue
injunctions, and increase the frequency of inspections. As suggested by the enforcement
pyramid approach of Ayres and Braithewaite, regulatory and enforcement bodies can
adjust their actions in response to behavior of the regulated community. Serious
economic consequences follow from the state’s use of any of these powers against
particular firms. In contrast, CSR initiatives must rely on the power of reputational risks,
which have only an indirect or uncertain cost element, as disincentives.
C.

Regulating Firms is a State Function

Despite an increase in international commerce and law-making, regulation
remains state based.89 On a general level, voluntary CSR initiatives seek to create an
international regulatory framework that applies directly to firms, thereby bypassing the
state. In light of the constraints on state expenditures arising from pressures of
international financial institutions and global capital markets, this attempt to regulate
from above is understandable. As a matter of regulatory and development policy,
however, it is mistaken.
States occupy a privileged position in connection with regulatory activities.90
Much attention has been given to state activity in shaping the substance of international
law through international fora, but along the way the central role of state-based regulation
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in the process of controlling economic activity has become obscured. Hirst and
Thompson put it well when they describe the state as the “locus of governance in a
galaxy of increasingly interlinked institutions of governance above and below it.”91 In
one sense, state-level regulatory systems constitute that locus.92 Only states can
undertake the necessary work to ensure that international norms to which they have
bound themselves in international fora are respected in their territories.
International fora produce norms that by their very nature are generalizable across
a variety of jurisdictions. Cosmopolitan democracy93 remains a valid concept when it
comes to defining generally agreed norms but cannot do the heavy lifting required to
regulate locally, something that must occur through local deliberative democratic
processes. Moreover, regulation of firms is in its essence particularistic. It is something
states are uniquely able to do.
Only states have the knowledge necessary to regulate industries operating within
their territories. They incorporate firms, whether as subsidiaries of multinationals or
domestic firms. Regulatory personnel at the state level have intimate knowledge of the
91
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regulatory framework existing in their jurisdictions. They understand the strengths and
weaknesses of domestic regulatory capacity. Likewise, they can assess the relative need
for self-regulatory measures versus traditional command and control regulation, for
instance. Practically speaking, structures to facilitate the participation of the public in
setting standards that concern matters of CSR can and should grow out of the state.
In comparison to voluntary CSR measures, which at best offer spotty coverage of
firms and industries, states regulate comprehensively.94 An environmental law, for
instance, applies to all firms of a certain size. Health and safety laws apply to all firms
operating certain types of facilities. CSR measures cannot claim the same degree of
coverage. Indeed, they generally apply to only a subset of (self-selecting) firms. They
may target only firms in certain industries or those which agree to participate in a given
program. The poverty of their coverage makes the rationale for the existence of CSR
initiatives—states’ lack of regulatory capacity—ring hollow.
States also act in ways that have direct monetary incentive or disincentive effects.
This power is most evident with respect to fiscal matters. States can, for instance, tax
firms that pollute excessively, for example. Compared to reputational effects, which may
indirectly harm corporate profits, the use of fiscal powers can reduce or increase profits
directly, thus constituting a potentially high powered incentive device. In contrast to the
massive array of financial incentives with which states can further or impede socially
responsible behavior, CSR appears to lack much horsepower.
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D.

Learning to Regulate (and Govern)

At their core, arguments promoting voluntary standards over regulation in
developing countries rest on utilitarian or pragmatic justifications. Proponents reason
that many states are unable to fulfill their obligations to enforce international or domestic
legal norms and thus the international community must create some alternative system to
prevent inappropriate practices from occurring. This pragmatic justification places all of
the value to society of adherence to these norms on the outcomes that follow and thus
ignores the social gains realized in the process of achieving those results. In other words,
how society comes to adhere to particular norms generates social goods distinguishable
from the outcomes. Such a process is particularly important for struggling democracies
and emerging market economies.
In many developing countries, state structures are weak.95 Regulators who are
resource strapped lack the ability or means to ensure that rules are followed. Poor
enforcement authorities, such as justice ministries, hinder vigorous litigation. Corruption
distorts state functions. Despite the prevalence of these phenomena, it is safe to say that
in many developing countries, attempts to improve the functioning of the state are ongoing. But reforms do not occur in a vacuum. For reforms of the state to take hold, the
state must take tangible actions to address concerns of the society.96 The enforcement of
norms relating to corporate social responsibility thus constitutes an important part of the
development of the state alongside the development of the market.
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By developing their capacity to regulate economic activity and harmful corporate
conduct, states gain needed knowledge. Initial enforcement actions and prosecutions of
corporations may be difficult and challenging but by going through the process,
enforcement personnel learn two things: first, that it can be done, and, second, the
techniques and challenges involved in holding firms to account for their actions. Overall
state capacity improves as a result of these efforts.
With successful enforcement efforts comes improved public esteem. State actors
and enforcement bodies gain credibility in the eyes of the public and build the reputations
of the responsible institutions. As state institutions are seen to be effective, regulatory
legitimacy is enhanced.97 In this sense, command and control regulatory systems so
frequently disparaged among regulatory scholars today, may, through their bright line
rules and clear enforcement practices, positively influence the public’s perception of the
state’s legitimacy.98 Moreover, the benefits of strong regulatory legitimacy strengthen
both the state and the market. Unless the development of state capacity occurs in tandem
with the development of the market, it becomes more likely that the weakness of the
former will jeopardize the latter.
Alternatively, if the state shows itself to be ineffective in controlling market
actors, then the state may come under attack. Angered by incompetence or lack of vigor
in the executive, citizens may demand more. For regulation and, more broadly,
governance to improve in many developing states, the conditions for effective redress and

97
98

BALDWIN AND CAVE, supra note 19, at 35.
Id.

communication between state and citizen must be strengthened.99 Perpetuating the
existing system of elite dominance can only retard the development process.
Strengthening these conditions involves the generation of local knowledge on
what is the preferred way to control corporations in particular jurisdictions. Different
jurisdictions will experience different labor practices, different production practices, and
different incentive schemes. Different tax structures may enable regulators to provide
incentives or disincentives that are unique to a jurisdiction. Different corporation laws
may facilitate the imposition of sanctions designed to correspond to prevailing
organizational structures in a jurisdiction. Different civil and criminal procedure laws
may make it more or less likely that actions can be successfully brought or defended.
Different licensing regimes may give regulators tools with which to control firm behavior
that are unique to a jurisdiction.
Likewise, regulatory institutions learn to regulate better by gaining an improved
understanding of the firms within their jurisdiction.100 To the extent that regulators
develop deeper knowledge of firm histories in their jurisdiction, they can better determine
what regulatory techniques to apply. States--not private auditing firms, NGOs making an
occasional visit to a country, or the press--are best equipped to distinguish cooperative
from uncooperative firms and regulate accordingly.101
The learning that occurs within regulatory and enforcement bodies is not
consigned to each institution standing alone. Such bodies can share practical experience
horizontally. As it becomes understood that one method of dealing with violators works
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better than another, knowledge can be shared across agencies. An environmental agency
may share useful experience with an occupational health and safety regulator that
improves practice in the latter, for example. Good knowledge dissemination practices
with respect to regulation and enforcement may improve the state of public management
overall.
Nor is learning confined to regulatory institutions. The process of defining and
developing a legal understanding about law and regulations designed to implement CSR
norms concerning the environment, labor or human rights domestically, enriches
countries’ legal systems. States implementing statutory or regulatory provisions related
to CSR, can tailor their enactments to the practice of their legal systems overall while
responding to the views of their citizens in determining an acceptable level of rigor of
such provisions. Under conditions of scarce resources, the state must ensure coordination
of regulatory priorities with broader development agendas. Moreover, after the
enactment of relevant norms, courts and administrative tribunals can then develop
doctrine and case law that ensures the compatibility between such norms and domestic
systems. Through legislative and judicial activity, domestic actors know whom to turn to
if dissatisfied. National debates can occur relating to the best way of regulating negative
labor or environmental practices. Likewise, courts can explore and work out national
positions on the line between nuisance and environmental harm or tort and human rights
violations. By rooting CSR provisions in domestic legal systems, countries may
organically tie such provisions to their shared experiences and hopes.
The view that states must exercise regulatory power within their jurisdictions over
CSR matters does not limit them to command and control regulation. States may opt to

develop structures in which management system standards or other more flexible
regulatory structures are built into existing systems. Even states that have endorsed
specific non-governmental standards, such as ISO 14000, have retained their power to
regulate. Rather than exempting ISO 14000 certified firms from all forms of
environmental regulation, for instance, certified firms may qualify for less intrusive or
less frequent inspections or receive favorable treatment in enforcement and settlement
proceedings.102 Yet the decision as to whether such matters ought best be left to wholly
self-regulatory initiatives, if ever justified, must undergo much closer scrutiny in states
struggling to assert their power and establish their legitimacy.
For these reasons, the expansion of voluntary CSR regimes that sidestep state
institutions creates significant problems for developing countries. Even assuming that
such initiatives can deliver the social goods, they leave state institutions no better off.
Indeed, to the extent that regulation of the economy comes to be seen as something that
non-state actors accomplish, the priority of building regulatory capacity in already fragile
African states will be underemphasized. As their markets develop, the gap between the
states’ abilities to oversee the market and actual market activity will only widen. Under
these conditions, if voluntary initiatives, even the more rigorous ones, leave social
conditions unimproved, the posited shortfall in state regulatory capacity will become of
even greater concern.
E.
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The call to put the state back in the center of private sector regulation is only one
part of the call to overcome the most pernicious applications of economic orthodoxy.
Rather than stand by as mere passive observers of the development process as implicitly
or even explicitly favored by neoliberals, states must develop their capacities to foster
development in strategic and intelligent ways. Turning over power to control (i.e.
regulate) socially harmful practices to the private sector through CSR initiatives,
effectively undermines the development of state capacity not only to regulate but also
expand the domestic economy and mitigate social harms.103
The history of neoliberalism is a history that casts state intervention in the
economy as an essential evil to be avoided. Yet continuing declines in economic growth
rates in African states even after neoliberal reforms suggests that development policy that
looks exclusively to the private sector may be misdirected. As the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank are forced to reconsider the approach to structural
adjustment, a new understanding of the role of the state and the need for more flexibility
in economic policy is emerging.104 Heterodox economists like Robert Wade and Joseph
Stieglitz have made compelling arguments for a larger role of the state in economic
development. From this perspective, notwithstanding the failure of certain state-led
development policies, such as import substitution, the state is viewed as an important
catalyst for growth.105 The state is thus not merely the source of the “rules of the game”
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after which point it must get out of the way. Viewed in this context, voluntary CSR
appears lost in the wilderness. At its core CSR posits a central role for non-state,
voluntary approaches to regulation in relevant fields. An improved economic
understanding of the role of the state versus the market sees the need for a strong state
capable of investing to promote growth rather than a weak state buttressed by regulatory
forces that operate independent of its authority. Promotion of economic growth as well
as the reduction of negative externalities can only happen through strong state
institutions.
If it is true that the neoliberal critique of the state has been behind the rise of
voluntary CSR initiatives and to the extent that development experience now suggests
that this critique has been oversold, one cannot consider voluntary CSR without first
rethinking the view of the state. That role involves designing regulatory policy in
harmony with economic and development policy. A precondition for the state playing a
role in promoting economic development is improved state capacity. In departing from
neoliberalism—both in its anti-Keynesian and liberalization phases—CSR begins to
appear less compelling. If a greater role for the state is accepted—particularly in
developing countries—there is no longer a need to accept the enfeebled solution of
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voluntarism but instead we may look towards a revitalized state that can advance
development that is just and vigorous.
V.

Examples of Alternatives: African Cases
The critique offered in the previous section proceeded on a general level. The

following section sets out some specific examples of how state regulatory and
enforcement authorities in African states can work to develop strong responses to societal
needs. The first seeks to show the value of state anti-corruption enforcement. This case
illustrates how building state capacity can enable states to confront socially irresponsible
corporate conduct. The second concerns a more technical matter involving efforts of
state regulators to coordinate their regulatory approaches and ensure equitable treatment
in international negotiations. In keeping with the developmentalist view advanced in this
paper, these initiatives speak to the challenges involved in creating functioning regulatory
and enforcement systems rather than suggest that ambitions have been categorically
achieved.
A.

Lesotho High Water Dam Prosecutions

In 1999, the Attorney General of Lesotho charged a former chief executive of the
Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP) with accepting $2 million in bribes from
international companies over ten years.106 Sponsored by the World Bank, the European
Union, and the European Investment Bank, the LHWP is Africa’s largest dam project
ever, intended to supply South Africa with water and Lesotho with electricity. The
Lesotho courts found the former official guilty on thirteen counts of bribery linked to the
LHWP and sentenced him to twelve years in prison.107 After his conviction, more than a
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dozen European and North American construction companies were also named in the
scandal.108
Among the firms named were Germany’s Lahmeyer International GmbH (owned
by RWE). Lahmeyer was charged on twelve counts of bribery and convicted of seven.109
It was fined approximately $1.6 million. On appeal these counts were all sustained and
the fines were increased to approximately $2 million. Similarly, Canada’s Acres
International was convicted of two counts of bribery and succeeded in having one count
overturned on appeal. It was fined approximately $2 million for its actions. In addition
to these prosecutions, the French firm, Schneider International, pled guilty and was fined
$1.6 million for its involvement. Finally, an agent of an Italian member of the
consortium Impreglio, pled guilty to arranging to bribe the chief executive of the project.
These actions represent “the first time that courts in a developing country have convicted
an international company for paying bribes rather than just prosecuting a local official for
taking bribes.”110
By all accounts, the resources required to conduct a prosecution of this magnitude
were substantial.111 The litigants were located all over the world. Tracing the proceeds
of the bribes required judicial cooperation with jurisdictions including Switzerland.
Aside from Switzerland, most other OECD countries and the EU failed to support these
prosecutions.112 More strangely, none of the project sponsors were willing to offset the
costs of the prosecutions.113 Moreover, because the project was set up as a corporation
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separate from the state, the Lesotho government had no recourse to any funds held by the
corporation to offset its costs. South Africa had considered offsetting some of the
expenses, however, to date this offer has apparently not been fulfilled. The United States
provided some assistance in the form of computers and Westlaw access established in the
law library in the Court of Appeals building.114
Notwithstanding these impediments, the Lesotho courts performed well.
According to judges on the Courts of Appeals and High Court, the difficulty involved in
coming to terms with large legal teams assembled by the firms under indictment was
significant.115 The dedication of time and resources for a small country such as Lesotho
was also considerable. Demonstrating the commitment of the government, this poor
country facing an HIV/AIDS epidemic had to commit resources to this case that could
have been used elsewhere.116 Judges from other jurisdictions and practitioners provided
assistance to the judiciary and attorney general’s office.117 To maximize judicial
resources, one judge was assigned to the cases full time. The noticeable pride of those
involved in the trials was that they had launched a major prosecution on a matter of
principle. In the words of a former South African judge, the Lesotho prosecuting
authorities “set an example of good governance, and have delivered a blow on behalf of
all countries who face major challenges in strengthening their infrastructure through
project activity.”118 It is a victory for the rule of law that a country like Lesotho was able
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to break through international banking secrecy in just over a year and make a successful
case against some of the world’s largest and most powerful contractors.
B.

Forest Law Enforcement and Governance in Cameroon

The Africa Forest Law Enforcement and Governance (AFLEG) initiative serves
as a clear instance where the international community has chosen the route of enhancing
regulation and enforcement as opposed to voluntary CSR in addressing significant risks
to the environment. After holding a summit in Yaounde in 1999, the states in Western
Congo Basin held a summit in 1999 designed to ensure that forests remained a renewable
resource and able to ensure biodiversity. Later Ministers from some of these countries
indicated their interest in focusing on forest law enforcement and governance issues.
From these beginnings, the AFLEG initiative was launched under the auspices of the
New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) as a way of strengthening a high
level commitment to build capacity for forest law enforcement, in particular relating to
illegal logging and hunting, associated trade, and corruption.119 Because the ministeriallevel focus of AFLEG proceeds at a fairly high level of generality and encompasses a
number of states, I will focus on the experience of one of the participating AFLEG states,
Cameroon, which has taken substantial steps in developing its forest protection efforts.
Timber is the second biggest export in Cameroon. As an effort to improve the
efficiency of the timber industry, increase tax compliance by logging firms, and improve
the welfare of local and indigenous peoples through community involvement in forest
management, Cameroon enacted the Forest Act of 1994 (the “Act”).120 The Act came
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into existence in part through the World Bank making it a matter of conditionality, but
required additional efforts lasting approximately five years for it to become
implemented.121 Because of its focus on preserving forests as a source of an
economically important resource, the Act combines concern for the environment with
broader development priorities.122
The Ministry of Environment and Forests administers the Act through the Central
Control Unit (CCU). The law initiates a decentralized program of forest management.
Local communities were given the right to manage up to 5000 hectares of forest on a 25
year rotation pursuant to a management plan. Communities incur expenses for filing the
plans but then reap royalties in the form of leases to logging companies. Taxes assessed
on the central government level for forest activities were also shared with local
communities. Private firms must obtain Forest Management Units that entitle them to
log over a given area for a specified period, subject to regeneration requirements.123
The CCU monitors compliance with the Act through field inspections. After
substantial evidence of corruption and irregularities in the forestry sector, the
international NGO, Global Witness, was invited by the Government of Cameroon in 2000
to work alongside the CCU inspectors and other Ministry departments to provide
independent observation.124 In addition to providing this independent verification, Global
Witness acts to build capacity among the inspectorate. It publishes periodic reports
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detailing compliance with the law, practices of the inspectors including failure to sanction
observed violations.
On the positive side, according to the Independent Observation reports issued by
Global Witness, since the system of independent observation began, the issuance of
official statements and prosecutions for illegal logging have increased.125 As a result of
program of law enforcement and independent monitoring, significant illegal logging
practices are more exposed in Cameroon than in neighboring countries.126 On the
negative side, Global Witness has also exposed cases involving non-transparent or
apparently corrupt practices by the Ministry, evidenced by the lack of scrutiny over
permit violations by certain private firms.127 The Ministry has also appeared reluctant to
issue official statements regarding offenses and appears lethargic and non-transparent
regarding fines.128 Likewise, the standards for documenting detected infractions appear
inadequate for judicial proceedings and CCU personnel undertake the inspection missions
with inadequate preparation.129 Global Witness recommends a program of training to
build capacity within the institution.
The lesson of the Cameroon process is that through sustained involvement of the
international community, including bilateral and multilateral donors and the NGO sector,
local law and enforcement capacity can be enhanced. The Cameroon forestry initiative
has not been without its critics. In particular, the extent to which community-based
governance approach has actually worked is a matter of great contention. As the Global
Witness review suggests, problems of corruption and competence undermine the
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effectiveness of the CCU.130 But analysis suggests that there is cause for optimism. In
the words of one observer, the shortcomings may be attributed to “growing pains” as the
state comes to terms with administering the new law. To development professionals
working with state governing and legal institutions, the challenges Cameroon faces are
familiar. Having already created a workable legislative framework, it must prevent
corrupt practices from infecting its inspection function, develop enforcement capacity,
prosecute cases to conclusion, and improve its competence in carrying out its oversight
functions. Meeting those challenges could make Cameroon an example for the Congo
Basin region.131
VI.

Conclusion
The notion that states should defer to international voluntary CSR initiatives as a

way of regulating important aspects of their economies, in such areas as labor, human
rights, and the environment, assumes erroneously that states will not need to develop this
capacity.132 To the contrary, globalization of production and trade is unlikely to stop in
our lifetimes. States need to develop the relevant capacity sooner rather than later.
The AFLEG initiative and Cameroonian efforts to enhance traditional state
regulatory and enforcement capacity rather than advance some sort of voluntary CSR
approach targeted at MNCs may be indicative of the international community’s desire to
develop a rigorous response to the issue of forest conservation. If this conclusion is
indeed true, then there may be reason to conclude that the matters taken up by voluntary
CSR programs simply do not enjoy the degree of political support needed to get serious
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about the issues. Viewed in this way, voluntary CSR is a sort of pragmatic compromise
while the international community weighs the need to take more forceful action.
Unfortunately, rather than take a developmentalist approach—viewing these programs as
transitional efforts on the way to more rigorous domestic regulation over CSR matters—
the discourse surrounding voluntary CSR employs the same broad brush optimism that
characterized Utopian visions in the past. Dropping down from universal heights, it
promises straight-forward solutions that will overlay the entire international economy.
On this view, all of the old rules no longer apply and, under the new rules, all of our
problems will magically disappear.
Given the predominance of market economies in today’s world, getting regulation right
must be a priority. Voluntary measures can only play a role if basic regulatory
frameworks are established. Contrary to the self-regulatory assumptions of voluntary
CSR proponents, state regulation of the environment and labor rights and enforcement of
human rights and anti-corruption laws, cannot be outsourced to international or private
voluntary organizations. Empowerment of domestic regulators is an essential component
of the struggle to realize the positive benefits of capitalist development while limiting its
negative aspects. As experience with the New Economy showed, we ought to be
skeptical of anyone suggesting that the rules of the game have shifted fundamentally such
that the old problems are no longer problems. This article contends that despite the
increasing dependence of firms in OECD countries on production based in developing
countries, the challenges are the same unglamorous challenges that regulators have faced
throughout the process of industrialization. Contrary to the universalistic aspirations of
CSR, strengthening domestic regulatory and enforcement institutions in developing

countries is messy work, involving processes of trial and error. We know the limitations
but must not understate the benefits of the monopoly on coercive power held by state
regulatory authorities. It is at a great peril that we cede these responsibilities to untested
methods that intuition, analysis, and experience suggest are bound to fail.

